TL;DR: →Press clicky; check vulnerability←
So, what’s going on?
A while back, on *checks email chain* 15 December 2015, I sent a mail to Ziggo’s security address. This contained a set of multiple vulnerabilities, only one of which is critical enough (and might be already exploited in the wild!) that I am going to highlight it.
Ziggo has, in their time, deployed multiple models of routers. Eventually, our household got sent their newest Wifi router/modem, which they were phasing in at that point. This modem was a Ubee EVW3200, and I suspect that the largest group of Ziggo users (that haven’t been migrated from UPC) have this router/modem combo.
So, after a while, I started poking around and found an issue that allowed practically any web page to authenticate with this device and send it commands. This is due the modem using a static default username/password
combination; Practically everyone remembers
draadloos, the default user/password combination on these devices. So, what can I do with this? … Everything.
- I can change your DNS settings
- I can set up a (secure :)) VPN tunnel to my own IP. With this I can basically ‘merge’ into the internal network, allowing me to poke at all the devices you have connected (and view the router settings!)
- I can (using another redacted trick) set the modem to broadcast another network, which has been set up with SSID and password of (my) choice.
- I can change port forwards
So, I can change everything that you, as user, can change too. Yay. And the worst part? This could be happening to you, right now, without you knowing! (don’t worry, I am not that evil… yet)
Oh no! How do I fix it?
You can’t. It’s a bug in the firmware, and I assume it’s also a bug in Broadcom’s reference firmware, as the EVW3200 makes a lot of use of it, including the web server system (recognizable by
Oh no! How do I avoid this happening to me?
Better question, because yes! There are ways to avoid being hit by this issue:
Change default username and password to something else
When you do this, people won’t be able to just use
draadloosto log in, and it will not be worth it to crack it (as you have no feedback that a login succeeds)
There is a disadvantage, because the login mechanism in the modem is a bit wonky, and the logout button is very well hidden. It remembers you are logged in based on your IP, and not cookies or other mechanism, so login sessions survive multiple reboots, other browsers, and even a full reinstall of your operating system. This makes it easier for attackers to change the settings on your modem.
More technical stuff
Basically, this is just your plain old CSRF attack. It’s not anything special, although of course it’s easy to deploy the exploit in a targeted way (based on Ziggo IP ranges), and it’s not that difficult to pull off. I’m not even the first one to publish it, see this. Of course, this isn’t all, as there’s enough persistent XSSes to find. I’m not even going to name them, as basically any field is a XSS vector. There’s a few fun ones, but figure them out yourself :)
If anyone has any clues on the format that GatewaySettings.bin is in, please contact me, via Twitter, Freenode, or just mail, via email@example.com or puckipedia.
(While we’re on the subject, it’s interesting how Ziggo has decided to stop Bapp basically a few weeks after I posted my blog post. I bet they went “Wait, do we have this? Huh, that’s weird.”)